ИСТИНА

We model restoration of an initially depleted transboundary marine fishery based on a highly-migratory stock in an evolving oceanic environment. Management is treated as a dynamic game among stakeholding nations of two (possibly-overlapping) classes: those with EEZs intersecting the stock’s range and those with flag-vessels holding harvesting licenses. The long-term goal of management is to restore the fishery to a biologically and economically productive level, while compensating those fishing vessels which, in the evolutionary process, agree to abandon their harvesting rights. Since this process is assumed to be self-funding, the long term model must incorporate a program of investment under uncertainty—with the early-time investments ultimately being paid by taxation of the remaining license holders. Prior to each harvesting season, agents of these stakeholders meet to negotiate the coming season’s compromise stock escapement and determine necessary constraints on overall fleet size and vessel-days of harvest to achieve this. Within the season, coastal states profit through discriminatory taxation of vessels’ access and seasonal days of fishing within their EEZs, while national-fleets receive net profits from their landings. Thus within-season interaction is sequential and competitive. In early seasons, compensation for license buyouts of excess-capacity will require borrowing, to be repaid in later periods by taxation of the increasingly affluent residual fleet. Thus even though only the current season’s decisions are being negotiated at the present time, a prior models of the entire recovery process, using each given stakeholder’s current expectations of future climate scenarios, will contend in arriving at the compromise decisions.