Strategic Choice of Russia

Авторы: Yerznkyan B.Y., Fontana K.A.
Сборник: Теория и практика институциональных преобразований в России: сборник научных трудов / под ред. Б.А. Ерзнкяна. Вып. 52
Год издания: 2021
Место издания: ЦЭМИ РАН Москва
Первая страница: 77
Последняя страница: 87
DOI: 10.33276/978-5-8211-0799-2-77-87
Аннотация: The situation of the strategic choice of the direction of the country's development is considered on a game-theoretic example relevant for presenting the features of Russian reality atthe turn of the 20th– 21st centuries. Some examples of discussion of problems of concern tosociety are given and assumptions are made regarding the nature of the mistakes of the reformers. A simple game-theoretic scheme illustrating the strategies of Russia and West isproposed, and an explanation of strategic mistake of Russia in the beginning of reforms isgiven. Based on the institutional analysis, the paper states that the game can be described using the trembling hand perfect equilibrium – the principle of optimality in non-cooperativegames, which is the Nash equilibrium with the additional property of resistance to sufficiently small deviations of players from equilibrium strategies.
Добавил в систему: Богодевич Наталия Геннадьевна

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