On effective fine functions for inspection -corruption games (evolutionary approach)

Авторы: Kolokoltsov V.N., Vetchinnikov Dmitry
Журнал: Mathematics
Том: 11
Год издания: 2023
Издательство: MDPI
Местоположение издательства: Basel, Switzerland
Номер статьи: 3429
Аннотация: In previous papers of the authors, a generalized evolutionary approach was developed forthe analysis of popular inspection and corruption games. Namely, a two-level hierarchy was studied,where a local inspector I of a pool of agents (that may break the law) can be corrupted and is furthercontrolled by the higher authority A. Here, we extend this two-level modeling by answering thefollowing questions: (i) what levels of illegal profit r of violators and what level of bribes a (fractionof illegal profit asked as a bribe from a violator) of an inspector are feasible, that is, realizable in stableequilibria of generalized replicator dynamics; and (ii) what a can be optimal for a corrupted inspectorthat aims at maximizing the total profit. Concrete settings that we have in mind are illegal logging,the sales of products with substandard quality, and tax evasion.
Добавил в систему: Колокольцов Василий Никитич

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